Archived Articles 2005
Interview with Swami Asokananda on Consciousness as Understood in Yoga ↑↑
January 30, 2005
An Integral View of Consciousness: An Interview with Swami Asokananda
Laura Sevika Douglass
Swami Asokananda began his formal study of Integral Yoga with Swami Satchidananda in 1971 at the age of nineteen.
Having left college during the Vietnam War, he applied for the status of conscientious objector. He was not only
awarded this status, but was granted permission to complete his community service at the Integral Yoga Institute
in New York. Inspired by the teachings of Swami Satchidananda, he chose to dedicate himself completely to the practice
of Yoga through service to others by taking formal vows of renunciation in 1975, and has been a practicing swami,
or monk, for 30 years.
On taking his vows, Swami Asokananda had hoped to be placed in a rural setting, far removed from the hustle and bustle
of his hometown in Queens, New York. His teacher, however, saw engaging more fully with the world, rather than moving
away from it would better foster Asokananda's spiritual growth. Asokananda continued his service at the NYC Integral
Yoga Institute, in the midst of the city that never sleeps, for the next 22 years, the last 17 of those years as President.
He now resides in rural Buckingham, Virginia at Yogaville, Satchidananda Ashram. Nestled in the foothills of the Blue Ridge
Mountain, in eyesight of the James River, the ashram is a perfect setting to regain peace and dive into the still waters of
the Self. Swami Asokanada's position, however, seems anything but calm. As President of Satchidananda Ashram-Yogaville and
Integral Yoga International, he oversees the service of thousands of people a year through the ashram's teacher training programs,
workshops, and welcome weekends. All of these community projects run alongside a fully functioning monastery, a spiritual book
distribution company, organic garden and full time karma yogis (volunteers) who run everything from the reception desk and
cooking to the administration, and teaching of the ashrams many programs.
While balancing the organizations complex needs, Swami Asokananda continues to pursue his own practice of Yoga and national
teaching schedule. Despite his busy schedule he agreed to be interviewed for this project.
I am very honored to have his perspective included in Eastern Principals of Consciousness and Therapy.
Swami Asokananda's understanding of this topic is, as he humbly proclaims, "homespun." That is, he has no formal academic
training on the topic of the mind. His understanding is cultivated from direct experience that is gleaned from years of
practice, study and the living of a Yogic lifestyle. One immediately senses these years of dedication and practice that
he is able to so easily translate into inspiring words that a beginning student of Yoga can understand. His presence is at once
inspiring, humbling, and incredibly down to earth.
Sevika (S): What is the mind?
Swami Asokananda (A): According to the non-dual philosophy called Advaita, there is only one thing that exists, which could be called Consciousness. It coalesces or condenses to form different levels of existence. One of the more subtle levels is called mind. At a more gross level it is called prana or energy, and at an even more condensed level it is called the body. So, just as H20 can become a liquid or gas or solid according to the condensation of the molecules, so the one Consciousness can express itself at different levels. When Consciousness manifests at the level of mind, it has the capacity to reflect itself. That is, it acts as a mirror that can either distort or accurately reflect who we truly are.
S: In that sense it is a tool?
A: Yes, ideally the mind is a tool that allows Consciousness to perceive itself. However, the mirror loses its purity and neutrality. Then the reflection is distorted and we take that distorted image to be our self.
The goal of Yoga is two fold. The first thing is to bring the mirror of the mind to a condition that it reflects accurately, which the yogis call chitta vritti nirodhah or stopping the waves of the mind. The second thing is to not identify with the mind, to separate Consciousness from identification with its tool. When Consciousness, or the True Being, identifies with vehicles through which It functions, that is called egoism. The Sanskrit term is ahamkar, or asmita, the false sense of self. We forget who we are, and then identify with our instruments - the body and the mind.
S: Western understanding is more along the lines that the mind itself manufactures consciousness. That the individual's mind is the creator of consciousness.
A: What do they call the mind? The brain?
S: I haven't been able to fully discern whether the broad understanding among psychologists is that they are the same or not. I am not sure if that is a
commonly held belief.
A: It may be that people in the field of psychology mostly think of the brain as the mind. Most Yoga teachings indicate that mind and consciousness certainly manifests to some degree through the brain, but it is not limited to it. If the brain is the source of my consciousness, my existence, and the brain dies when my body dies, then I am gone at death. Then death is the ultimate catastrophe. Yogis would not agree that your existence is dependent upon a physical brain.
S: Which is difficult to conceive from a western model.
A: It is a difficult jump, but there are weird things that happen that science cannot explain. People who are on the operating table flat line and watch everything that is happening from the ceiling. They can tell the doctors exactly what was happening. It's hard to explain spooky stuff like that from the Western paradigm.
S: What creates this different paradigm? It is a fundamentally different way of looking at things.
A: I think one thing that creates it is that science is based on empirical observation, things you can confirm through testing. What we are talking about no one can confirm through testing. So far no one has been able to figure out how to do it. But science is starting to come up with some evidence that the mind and body are not totally separate and independent, and that if you want to affect them you need a more holistic approach. This way of seeing is moving into the mainstream thinking now. It is a move in the right direction, but it will take a while for the establishment to settle in to the world view that the yogis have.
S: It seems that we are still working from a Newtonian model of consciousness, whereas even science has moved on to a quantum sense of reality and self.
But that we, as a culture, can't quite make the jump. It would require us to re-order how we approach each other, institutions, our organizations and ourselves.
Right now our entire culture is designed to satisfy "us," as material individuals.
A: Even the scientists who are the proponents of quantum mechanics, who are saying that there is no such thing as the material world, have a hard time living in a way that shows that they have been able to make the jump. Intellectually they understand, but "getting it" is another matter. That is what we call a spiritual lifestyle. That re-ordering requires a paradigm and cultural shift that could take hundreds of years.
S: What are the qualities of one who has a healthy mind? How can we recognize one who rightly understands their relationship to the mind?
A: First we have to define what we mean by a "healthy mind." Can you say what you mean by it?
S: I think that a healthy mind is one that understands we are not the mind alone and that we are able to use the mind as a tool to perceive reality without
getting caught up in a lot of our conditioning. That the mind clearly perceives.
A: Is it possible to clearly see that you are not the mind, but the mind still has neuroses?
S: Yes, I think so.
A: I would think so. Dis-identifying with the mind is probably the best healer, but when we are watching the mind it can still have some pretty strange patterns. Non-identification is a great movement towards health. Such a person has a much greater capacity to observe the mind and help the unconscious to become conscious, where it can be dealt with and healed. That is a common goal of psychotherapy and Yoga.
According to Freud a healthy mind is one that is fit to have ordinary unhappiness as opposed to neurotic unhappiness. That is one level of health. There is a normal unhappiness in life and you don't add to that with your neurosis. That is a stage of health I would say.
S: That you can be unhappy without complicating it?
A: Right. You see there is misery in life. I see that and I am not going to aggravate that by my reactions to it. I am going to be conscious of my reactions to this hostile environment that I have been dumped in. That is what Freud wanted for you, to be conscious of your reactions. You are trapped in a negative experience and you are going through it consciously and not adding to the misery of it.
Yogis would not stop where Freud left off. Some yogis would say that a definition of a healthy mind is one that would see everything as neutral. Others would say, "No, why see the world as neutral? It is benevolent. From a spiritual perspective, not only is it not hostile, the environment is supporting you at every moment." That kind of world view brings a relaxed cheerfulness that results in many mental health benefits. How we perceive the world around us is the primary factor in determining our sense of well-being.
Certainly one of the qualities of a person with a healthy mind is "wakefulness" - being aware of what's taking place within and around us. Some part of our consciousness should know what the mind is doing and assess what thoughts are useful and beneficial for our growth and enjoyment of life and what thoughts should not be nourished. Then we can put our energy into moving in the right direction, as opposed to being pulled away by old, established patterns.
So, three factors contribute to the development of a healthy mind:
1) Increasing self-awareness;
2) A capacity to choose the right direction, and
3) The ability to behave according to the direction we set.
S: The second part of that is how can one recognize that others have a healthy mind?
A: I can recognize someone with a healthy mind when I see that because they are not so wrapped in their own needs and subconscious patterns, they are able to be present with me and actually care about me. It is very hard, maybe impossible, for someone that doesn't have this kind of mental health to truly care for another. The caring gets polluted by the overriding pull to fulfill their own needs. Pure caring is a beautiful and rare experience. People express their love at the level of their psychological and spiritual development, and I don't want to disparage that. But we all tend to find "what's in it for me" sneaking in. Someone with a healthy mind wouldn't be loving me in that way. I would feel some kind of qualitative difference in my experience of that person that I wouldn't get with anyone else.
S: They are getting their needs met from an internal source so they do not need to grasp at externals?
A: Right. Since they don't need me, then how are they getting their needs met? Through some inner resource. The interesting thing is that even though these folks are satisfied and contented because their needs are met through this internal source, they don't say, "Well I got what I need, You guys can take care of yourself." Having their needs met allows them to feel more connected with others, and this connection will produce a feeling of caring, and this caring will manifest in their actions - into some type of selfless action.
S: I would like to go back to the Yoga Sutras, which state that avidya or ignorance lies at the root of all mental distress. What is the fundamental nature of avidya?
A: Now we are talking about very subtle things. There is pure consciousness that can never lose awareness of itself, but it seems to also have the power to seemingly veiled itself so that it apparently doesn't remember what it is. Forgetting its reality, consciousness looks around for something to hold on to and it becomes this separate body-mind complex. And all the other separate body-mind complexes will mutually support this fixation that we are a body-mind, as opposed to the awareness that we have a body and we have a mind.
When we are born, we are closer to our natural state of pure awareness, but we are not able to function in this world and need to be taken care of. Still, when the baby has gas, it cries from the discomfort. It identifies with the sensations and feels "I have this pain. Can anybody help me?" And the mama feels, "My baby's in pain and I have to do something about it." Patanjali would see avidya permeating this situation. It's not that one who is free from avidya would not do everything possible to ease the suffering. It's just that the attitude behind the actions would be very different.
S: So the basis of avidya is a mis-perception about our true nature? Or about the nature of consciousness?
A: Both. The nature of it and the mis-perception of it.
S: Yoga is basically a practice for liberation. Can you comment on the appropriateness of Yoga as a therapy for those with mental illness? Whether for
mild disturbances such as anger, fear and jealousy to more severe mental illnesses such as schizophrenia and bi-polar disorder. Is this an appropriate use of Yoga?
A: I would think so. I think Yoga was originally designed to lead someone with a healthy psyche to the next level. However, I think Yoga does have a lot to offer people who have psychological problems. Mental health is a continuum. You could say that we are all have some form of mental illness. Yoga can be of help to those who are a little sick, as well as those who are very sick. Maybe someone who is having a schizophrenic experience and tries to sit with their mind in meditation won't do well with that. But they may do very well with chanting powerful sound vibrations or some yoga postures or breathing practices.
Someone who is "out of their mind" is often out of touch with their body as well. So yoga may start with making the person more aware, sensitive, and integrated in the body. It may be helpful to attune the person to the breath and provide the tools for using the breath to calm and steady the mind. There are many tools that yoga has to offer.
S: Individuals with PTSD or bi-polar disorder are so connected to their mental states that they often are not at all connected to their body.
A: We started off saying that the body is not any different then the mind. The important thing is to get the body in a more relaxed state. You've got to start from somewhere. What can we relax? Can I relax my thumb? My whole hand? How about my whole arm? We need to start from somewhere.
S: Is there anything we haven't discussed that you feel is important to share on this topic?
A: It is helpful to know how we are going to approach this individual sense of self that is cut off from our True Self. Is this egoistic personality out to hold me
back by any and all means possible? Or is it simply an undeveloped part of myself, operating mostly out of fear, that I can help to mature by raising it properly? This is an
important question since it will effect everything in my life - how I relate to myself and how I relate to others. Do I need to rid myself of an evil or do I need to find ways of dealing with an unruly kid? I lean toward the unruly kid approach, but it's not always so clear.
S: Discipline. So asking what is discipline what is the role of discipline?
A: The deeper questions of who is disciplining who? Who is training who? We want to gain some clarity around that. A lot of what we are talking about, if you scratch the surface a little bit, is about fear. This individual sense of self is based on fear. A lot of maturing and psychological health has to do with not being afraid.
S: I definitely have touched on this fear in my own personal practice. I don't know if other than just continuing to practice and just being with
it there is anything else one can necessarily do?
A: I think being with it is a way to move through it. Awareness is like pulling the curtain on the Wizard of Oz. Once you can see him clearly, you understand that this seemingly all-powerful despot is just a guy from Kansas.
For more information on Swami Asokananda and Integral Yoga visit www.yogaville.org
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Psychotic and Mystical States of Being ↑↑
Psychotic and Mystical States of
Being:
Connections and Distinctions
Abstract: Previous analyses of
descriptively defined psychotic phenomena have concluded that they can
occur in benign spiritual experiences as well as pathological states.
Attempts to forge a distinction between psychotic experiences in
spiritual and pathological contexts on the basis of the form or content
of the experience (broadly described) can be disproved by
counterexample; distinguishing on the basis of negative or positive
consequences of the phenomena for the individual can be seen to beg the
question. In the present paper, it is argued that examining the
fundamental conceptual organization of psychotic and mystical mental
states not only elucidates the observed similarities between them, but
can highlight the differences, and the processes by which negatively
evaluated pathological features can be seen to emerge. Oriental
philosophical systems such as Tibetan and Zen Buddhism, and Tantric
Hinduism, provide conceptualizations of mystical states of mind, from
which a model can be drawn, while the epistemologies of these systems
provide an illuminating metaphysical perspective on both psychotic and
mystical experiences. It is concluded that mystical and psychotic
experiences can be distinguished not only by emotional and behavioral
consequences, but by real differences in the states themselves; certain
features, such as loss of subject/object boundaries and loss of the
relative dimensional structure of perception, are common to both
processes.
IT HAS LONG BEEN RECOGNIZED that there are similarities
between spiritual and psychotic experiences. Both kinds of experience are
"altered states," and a wide variety of phenomena are common to both: for
example, radical change of belief, time distortion, perception of and
communication with supernatural entities, perception of meaning in events
and purpose in life, social withdrawal, and so on. Moreover, the content
of both kinds of experience can bear striking similarities, religious
themes being common in psychotic delusions, and the epistemological
revelations of spiritual experiences often contrasting sharply with the
everyday view of reality.
Any analysis traditionally begins with definitions of the terms used,
but of course both spiritual experiences and psychoses come in many
varieties, and there is no universally agreed definition of the terms
themselves. However, in practice there is broad agreement as to which
individuals are described as psychotic, and there are certain
commonalties found across diverse accounts of spiritual experiences that
allow generalizations to be made about these kinds of states.
Some commentators have wanted to collapse the two definitions into each
other by claiming either that all spiritual experiences are psychotic or
symptomatic of some pathology, or that psychotic [End Page 321]
experiences should not be viewed as pathological but rather as spiritual
experiences that are pathologized by society (Group for the Advancement of
Psychiatry 1976; Laing 1967). Alternatively, it could be held that the
only distinction that can be drawn between the two is on the basis of harm
to the individual: thus, an experience of an altered state that leads to a
positive outcome, or can be interpreted and integrated in a positive
light, will be a spiritual experience, and psychotic experiences by
definition are those altered states that lead to a negative outcome.
In the present paper, spiritual or mystical experiences
are those states in which the form of experience is altered from normal
consciousness, resulting in a new understanding of the basic nature of
reality, life, and the individual. Psychotic experiences are those states
that also flow from alterations of the form of experience, but result in a
pathological interaction between the individual and the world. Therefore,
according to these definitions, phenomena occurring in a spiritual context
may be identical to those traditionally viewed as symptoms of psychosis,
but cannot be seen as psychotic in themselves. By examining more closely
the phenomenology and the organization of the experience of the psychotic
and the mystic, as well as the epistemology of spiritual systems, the
present paper aims to examine these phenomena in both contexts.
The paper investigates the form of experience involved in the early
psychotic state, specifically the "delusional mood," 1 and the form of experience involved in mystical
states, drawing from Eastern spiritual traditions, with the purpose of
elucidating the relationship between the two categories of altered state.
Similarities in conceptual structure, corresponding to similarities in the
existential stance of the individual, are demonstrated. Conceptual
differences are also identified, highlighting factors that can be
understood to give rise to negatively evaluated, pathological features of
experience, which can lead to a diagnosis of psychosis.
Zen Buddhism provides a model for the cognitive reorganization involved
in a mystical or transcendent state; the Tantric systems of Tibetan
Buddhism and Advaita Vedanta provide models of both mystical and
pathological states, in terms of the development and possible imbalance of
spiritual energies. This analysis focuses on one particular subset of
mystical experiences because the phenomenology of mystical states in the
Eastern tradition appears to match that of the delusional mood in both
intensity and specific features. Comparing both the phenomenology and the
models suggests possible causal factors that could contribute to the
processes of cognitive reorganization, which lead to either benign
mystical or pathological psychotic conditions.
Background
The recent growth of interest in the philosophical aspects of
psychopathology has led to an acknowledgement of the limitations of the
definitions of such symptoms as delusions as is found in the DSM-IV (APA
1994). The search for alternative conceptualizations of delusions (as the
paradigm marker of psychotic states) has brought up the issue of the
relationship or distinction between spiritual and psychotic experiences.
Empirical studies comparing religious and deluded individuals call into
question diagnostic criteria for delusions that emphasize the content
(i.e., bizarreness or falsity) of beliefs to classify them as
pathological, whereas anthropological writings indicate that similar
mental states may be classified as disorders in some cultural settings,
and religious experiences in others (Peters et al. 1999;Peters, Joseph,
and Garety 1999; Bhugra 1996). This indicates that comparison of the
content of beliefs cannot distinguish spiritual from psychotic ideation.
On the other hand, certain differences in the kind of experience have
been suggested: for example, the mystic avoids grandiosity and delusions
of omnipotence, which can characterize psychosis; delusions of persecution
and auditory hallucinations are also prominent in psychotic but not
mystical experiences (Greenberg et al. 1992). Chadwick (2001) points out
that in the mystic, the intuitions that occur in the altered state appear
to emanate from the self toward the world, whereas in the psychotic, the
intuitions [End Page 322] tend to revolve around the intents of the
world toward the self. For example, the mystic notices that "there is
great harmony and oneness between all things" whereas the psychotic
notices that "people and the world are all together in communication
against me." Thus, the mystic is concerned with how the self fits into the
universe and the psychotic is concerned with the meaning of events in
relation to the self. This implies a slightly different organization of
experience or stance toward the experience, which may influence the
repercussions of the initial altered state.
According to other authors looking at the subject, the major
differences seem to lie in the interpretation and meaning given to the
experiences, and in the emotional and behavioral consequences of such
experiences (Peters 2001; Jackson and Fulford 1997; Saver and Rabin 1997).
Usually, spiritual experiences have adaptive and life-enhancing
consequences; in psychosis similar phenomena often lead to social and
behavioral impoverishment.
For example, Peters and colleagues (1999) and Peters, Joseph, Garety
(1999) conclude that delusions can be differentiated from religious
beliefs, not by content, but by such factors as the extent to which they
are believed, how much they interfere with one's life, and the emotional
impact. Greenberg and associates (1992) conclude that a diagnosis of
psychosis rests on factors such as duration of the state, ability to
control entry into the state, and deterioration of habits, rather than the
phenomenology of the state itself. For example, mystical experiences are
usually transient and resolve completely, without leaving residual social
difficulties or isolation, in contrast to psychotic states, which
generally persist for a long period and may leave residual dysfunction and
social withdrawal.
It must be noted that the distinction cannot be made purely on the
negative or positive evaluation of the experience by the individual,
because some psychotic patients have a positive attitude toward their
experiences (Chadwick and Birchwood, 1994). They may deliberately stop
taking neuroleptic medication or ingest cannabis or other drugs to induce
a delusional atmosphere or restore their psychotic state, presumably
because they feel it is preferable to their nonpsychotic reality (Peters,
2001). In contrast, some of the intense spiritual experiences described by
Jackson and Fulford's sample were neither solicited nor controllable, and
were initially very frightening for the individuals.
Jackson and Fulford (1997) conclude that psychosis (descriptively
defined) cannot be differentiated from mystical experience on the basis of
either form or content, but depends on the way in which the phenomena are
"embedded in the values and beliefs of the person concerned."They describe
a "cognitive problem solving model," which suggests that altered states
can be triggered by intense stress or existential crisis, and that if the
resultant paradigm shift provides an "insight" that is utilized to solve
the initial problem, the process will be self-limiting and pathological.
This seems plausible, but raises certain questions: which kinds of
interpretation of unusual experiences are pathological? What is the
interaction between the original phenomena and the "values and beliefs"
that shape the interpretation? Why do some altered states lead to
the formation of delusions that have negative emotional and behavioral
consequences, such as delusions of persecution, whereas other altered
states have a positive or neutral impact, and therefore any beliefs formed
as a result of the experience are unlikely to be classified as delusions?
It is with the aim of investigating these issues that a closer analysis of
the organization of experience in psychotic and mystical states is
undertaken in this paper.
The conceptual analysis of the structure of experience and "existential
stance" involved in psychosis is focused particularly on the delusional
mood, in which alterations in perception, cognition, and sense of
identity are evident. This avoids any equivocation regarding the status of
particular delusions (which can be viewed as either constitutive of
psychosis, or resulting from or reparative efforts after
psychosis), as well as considerations of their content. The analysis draws
on models of the structure and development of the "ordinary" mind provided
by Kant, Husserl, and Piaget. [End Page 323]
Similarly, the analysis of the organization of mystical experience
draws from the systems of Zen and Tibetan Buddhism, and Tantric Yoga,
because they provide detailed conceptualizations of the cognitive
reorganization involved, which are directly and pertinently comparable to
the phenomena of the delusional mood. This contrasts with the more
descriptive analysis of form made by Jackson and Fulford (1997), for
example, who drew attention to the similarities between the phenomena
reported by religious experiencees, and diagnostic criteria of delusions,
thought insertion, and auditory hallucinations. Jackson and Fulford
conclude that a distinction cannot be made on the basis of form, but they
do not examine the inner conceptual structure of the case studies
experience.
In fact, it might be relevant that, in the reported case studies given
by Jackson and Fulford, the unusual experiences described by the
individuals seem to occur in a relatively circumscribed way; that is, they
describe auditory hallucinations, instances of thought insertion, and
revelations consistent with primary delusions, but they do not report
subtle yet global alterations in their subjective experience of time and
space, or selfhood, for example. Although their experiences involved a
sense of direct and personal communication with external agents, they did
not involve more fundamental changes in perception of the external world
or the relationship of the world to themselves.
A Conceptual Analysis of Psychosis
To start to unravel "the paradox of delusion," it is necessary to
examine assumptions about the nature of mind and its relationship to the
world. The classic view of psychosis assumes that the relationship of the
mind to the world is a given, and that delusions can be identified on the
basis of their falseness, incorrigibility, and certainty (APA, 1994). All
of these criteria can be called into question for a variety of reasons:
for example, the falsity criterion assumes that delusions consist
of statements about external reality that can be proved false. In fact, a
significant proportion of delusional beliefs are of the sort that lack any
clear empirical content, or do not refer to "external reality" as such,
and therefore the issue of truth or falsity is either not applicable or
unlikely to be solved.
It has proved extremely difficult to formulate an alternative
satisfactory definition of a delusion that reliably distinguishes
pathological beliefs or belief formation from "normal" beliefs (Garety,
1985). Holding a delusion with absolute conviction cannot be deemed
pathological in itself, because all beliefs that are personally
significant tend to be held with absolute conviction (Maher, 1988). A
confirmation bias, which allows us to be impervious to contradictory
evidence and only notice information that confirms our preexisting
beliefs, has also been shown to be a feature of normal cognition (Alloy
and Tabachnick, 1984).
An alternative approach is to examine the form rather than the content
of the psychotic state, which is understood as an altered state of
consciousness that may demonstrate a particular structure of experience.
From this viewpoint, delusions can be seen as schemata or belief
structures that represent attempts to interpret and organize the
perceptions that arise in the psychotic state. Although delusions may be a
main observable sign of pathology, on this view they are not the primary
source of pathology: this can be seen to be the state, or
structure, of psychotic experience, which may be reflected in
delusional beliefs. This paradigm shift avoids the distortions introduced
by assuming that delusions are simple instances of stubborn error
concerning some objective state of the world.
To analyze the features of the psychotic state, it is necessary to
describe a system or taxonomy of the normal mind, with which a comparison
can be made. Several authors have made use of Kant's analysis of the
organization of experience, as well as drawing from the models of Husserl,
Hegel, and Piaget (Wiggins, et al., 1990; Spitzer, 1990; Hundert, 1990b;
Graham and Stephens, 1994b, 1996; Klein, 1990).
The Structure of Mind:
Subjectivity, Categories, and
the External World
There is, or should be, a close link between the philosophical and
psychological levels of analysis [End Page 324] of the nature of
mind (Gallagher, 1997; Mishara and Schwartz, 1997). In cognitive
psychology, the epistemological framework is sometimes called
constructivism, the main point being that the world's nature is not
the starting point of cognition, but its expression. This is echoed in the
models of Kant (1781/1934) and Piaget (1937/1954), both of whom were
concerned with the contributions of "thoughts to things" (Hundert, 1990a,
38). Likewise, Husserl's phenomenology emphasizes the constitutive
functioning of the mind, postulating a constituting subject that
constitutes both the world and itself as part of the world.
The organizing activity of the subject should not be overlooked (as is
often the case in the "empirical" worldview), because the subject becomes
aware of connections in the external stimuli only to the degree that he
can assimilate them by means of existing structures. These structures can
be seen as a kind of grammar: structural qualities that allow data to be
organized into concepts amenable for cognitive operations (Klein, 1990).
Not only can the parameters or dimensions of the external perceived world
be seen as the product of the schemata into which representation is
organized, but also the experience of the self as an entity acting in this
external world must be seen as the product of schemata of cognition.
Awareness of the self as an entity, and the boundaries of the self in
contrast to the external world, must be constructed and maintained as the
background context for incoming stimuli.
Kant viewed the structures or Categories as epistemologically a priori,
in the sense that, once a concept is constructed, it is applied to
experience and immediately externalized so that it appears to the subject
as a perceptually given property of the object and independent of the
subject's own mental activity.
However, as Piaget demonstrated in his studies of the development of
cognition, there is a reciprocal relationship between the environment and
the individual's experience of the environment, whereby the structures of
experience adjust to reality through accommodation, and reality is
assimilated to existing structures. Hegel described the development of
cognition as a process through which "reason examines its concepts,
seeking ever broader contexts of experience" (Hundert, 1990a, 40). Piaget
conceptualized the process as thought turning in on itself at each stage,
one schema incorporating another through progressive decentrations. He
described the development of four categories of understanding in the first
2 years of a child's life: object, space, time, and causation. Of these,
the category of object is the subject of most of this discussion.
Husserl's phenomenology divides intentive processes into active and
passive/automatic. The active subject is what is experienced as the agent
or ego, and the passive processes are undirected and intend objects in the
field of perception. Husserl identifies something akin to Kant's
categories described above, as an urdoxa: a primordial, unshakeable
certainty in the fundamental features or dimensions of the world and
myself. Thus, whereas mental life consists of change in the world and
self, these changes occur within limits because certain aspects are
experienced as invariant.
Husserl describes the construction of an external world of objects as
involving two kinds of process: first, multiple automatic intentive
processes that are synthesized to produce objects with manifold features
and gestalt coherence; and second, mental life automatically
ascribes ontic statuses to objects and their properties. Thus,
objects can display indefinitely many degrees of reality and unreality,
whereas ontic statuses are understood to interact in a structure of
compatibility. This means that the world has a basic unalterable
ontological status, and so a particular property's ontic status may alter
if an incompatible property is experienced with a certain ontic status.
The self is constituted in a similar way by the constituting subject:
mental life automatically intends its own processes. In addition to
intending its objects, it intends future mental processes, and past phases
of the same mental life. Thus mental life unifies itself through this
inner time and experiences itself as continuously the same over time; the
extended self is the contiguously unified totality of subjective
experience.
Kant emphasized the reciprocal nature of the developments of the
capacity to have unitary [End Page 325] subjective experiences and
the capacity to experience unitary permanent objects; in other words, in
creating the conceptual structure of a stable autonomous world
(objectivity), the concept of the self is created concurrently
(subjectivity).
It is postulated that the development of the subject/object boundary is
born of the frustration of desires or lack of fit between experience and
expectations: the infant adjusts from undifferentiated solipsism to
differentiated realism on the basis of a painful lack of control over
events (Hundert, 1990a). Objective reality, as the achievement of a
subject, is the conceptual structure wherein objects of perception are
viewed as existing regardless of one's perception of them, regardless of
one's own existence. It must be achieved by eliminating the effect of the
changing features of the subject's position with regard to the object, and
therefore the concept of the subject existing independently of the objects
of perception is presupposed. The development of the concepts of the self
and the external world therefore entails a disregarding of the fact that
both reified entities are abstracted from the bare process of awareness.
Much recent psychological investigation has been focused on the
development of the child's theory of mind, which occurs by about 4 years,
and may be a very important schema by which the child interprets his
social reality (Baron-Cohen, 1992). It could be argued that the notion of
the self as the bare subject becomes elaborated with the development of
the theory of mind, as the child develops the notion of subjective
experiences or representations of the objective world that can be
contrasted with each other. As the child learns to conceptualize another's
false belief, the epistemological organization of the child's experience
can be expected to shift as he or she appreciates the idiosyncrasy of his
or her own subjective viewpoint. This development can be understood to be
crucial in orienting the child in social or intersubjective reality.
These analyses of the structure and activity of the mind are models of
normal functioning; Kant believed that his categories of understanding
were "necessary conditions of any possible experience." However, it
appears that they are one set of sufficient conditions for one particular
sort of experience: sanity, by the standards of Western rationalism. The
following section examines how the psychotic state or delusional mood can
be conceptualized.
The Delusional Mood
The delusional mood is one in which the perceptual world seems
to have undergone some subtle but all-encompassing change. The world may
seem strangely insubstantial, or mutable, and bathed in a kind of aura of
particularity, meaningfulness, or knowing. Events and features of the
world may seem intimately related somehow to the subject, either in the
sense that they are signs directed at the subject or in the sense that
they have been caused by or otherwise affected by the subject's thoughts
or intentions. These features have been described by Sass as "the
subjectivised domain" of the delusional mood: an apt description, because
they can be interpreted as representing a loss of the concrete
self-existence of the external world, and a mingling of the subjective or
mental aspects of experience with the external, material aspects.
Below are some examples of statements that have been made by people
experiencing the delusional mood, which give a flavor of the subjective
phenomenology (taken from Spitzer, 1990):
It is like a constant sliding and shifting
that slips away in a jelly-like fashion, leaving nothing substantial and
yet enough to be tasted, or like watching a movie based on a play and,
having once seen the play, realizing that the movie is a description of
it and one that brings back memories and yet isn't real . . . For what
is, is, and yet what seems to be is always changing and drifting away
into thought and ideas, rather than actualities.
For me the substance has become spirit.
Things do not feel real. There is something between me and the things
and persons around me; something like a wall of glass between me and
everything else.
everything that happens is in reference to me . . . For instance,
when I read a book or a newspaper, one thinks that the ideas in them are
my own; when I play a song or an opera arrangement for the piano, one
thinks that the text of the song or opera expresses my own feelings.
[End Page 326]
Time has disappeared. Not that it is longer or shorter, it's just not
there; there are bits and pieces of time, shaken and mingled; often
there is no time at all.
Things are not seen by me, only by my eyes.
I am closer to the soul, to Dante's Paradise, in that world, but I
feel removed from life, devoid of emotion, and detached from everything.
Thus, the delusional world involves fundamental transformations in the
conceptual structures of space, time, and identity, and in the perceived
nature and reality of consciousness itself. Various schizophrenic
phenomena, such as depersonalization, passivity phenomena, ideas of
reference, and derealization, can be understood as related within an
interpretative framework that examines the altered structure of
experience, rather than the specific content of delusions or
hallucinations.
The Psychotic Mind:
Structure, Phenomenology, and
Pathology
The structure of experience involved seems to be one in which the
application of the categories is disrupted. Thus, the contents of
experience are not perceived via the stable structures that confer the
status of substance to external objects, and mental to the internal self.
As the categories are understood to be intimately interdependent, the
frameworks of time, space, substance, and causal interaction, which
ordinarily underpin cognition, may all be distorted concurrently in the
psychotic state.
According to the Husserlian phenomenology, this can be understood as
the erosion of the constituting subject, leading to a disintegration of
both the constituted world and self (Wiggins, et al., 1990). This is
described as resulting in a situation of ontological insecurity, as the
urdoxa is shaken, and the invariant and necessary features of
experience are perceived as dissolving or unreliable: the fundamental
ontology of reality has grown unclear. As the synthetic processes are
weakened, objects lose their gestalt coherence, and the features of the
world and the self are no longer inviolably differentiated. The syntheses
of inner time, too, are attenuated, meaning that the present phase
of mental life will only weakly intend past and future phases of itself.
Thus, mental life will reside primarily in a present awareness, which is
experienced as simply enduring, without being contextualized by a receding
past or approaching future.
Sass (1994) made an extensive analysis of the delusional mood in his
book, The Paradoxes of Delusion, drawing upon the philosophy of
Wittgenstein. He suggests that the characteristics of the psychotic state
can be understood as the result of consciousness turning in upon itself,
away from practical and social activities, and away from the input of the
body and emotions. The result is an experiential position akin to the
philosophical doctrine of solipsism, which is related to phenomenalism in
that it denies objective material entities and reduces existence to
thought: "The stance of passive concentration gave rise . . . to a
pervasive sense of subjectivization, of experiencing experience rather
than the external world, to a feeling that . . . " everything that happens
is in reference to me " . . . Such experiences of delusional and
subjectivized reality seem to be embedded in a form of consciousness that
is hyperacute, hyper-self-conscious, and highly detached . . . " (40).
Thus turning the attention to experience itself rather than the
world leads to the impression that the world is just a perception, an
ideational phenomena, and is thus dependent on one's own mind for
existence in some crucial way, or else is a private, inner phenomenon.
Additionally, the perceived world may appear devoid of life in itself,
like scenery that has no substance or independent existence.
According to Kant's analysis, an alteration in the status of the
external world should be linked to a corresponding alteration in the
status of the self, and indeed we have seen this is the case. A widespread
feature of delusions is the involvement of a sense of actions and thoughts
as under the scrutiny and control, or in the presence or possession, of
some other agency, as well as feelings of the negation of the self,
unreality, or unaliveness.
Sass comments that the logic of the solipsistic position entails that a
self cannot be found in subjectivity itself, because if there is no
differentiation [End Page 327] between one's experience and the
world in itself, there can be no contrastive identity. Therefore, trying
to grasp this position conceptually (and thus take an ontological stance
as a subject of experience) yields an epistemic or ontological paradox.
The resultant shifting between the experience of one's own consciousness
as both a constituted object, and the ultimate, constituting subject can
be seen reflected in both delusions of omnipotence and grandiosity, and
delusions of control, passivity, and negation.
Moreover, the counterpart to the subjectivization of the external world
is the reification of the ideological domain. Sass dubs this "phantom
concreteness": when thoughts, ideas, and sensations seem reified,
substantial, and objectified. It appears, therefore, that the conceptual
structures that confer substantiality to objects of perception are still
exerting some effect, albeit in a fundamentally altered way.
It could be hypothesized that some process of the mind continues to
apply the category of object (in contrast to subject),
although the focus of attention is turned onto subjective experience
itself. Thus subjective experience itself, in being observed, is put at a
distance from the subject in the kind of "decentration" that Piaget
described. Following this line of reasoning, as the "objectifying" process
is turned on mental processes themselves, the conceptual space that the
self as subject can fill gets smaller. The "active" processes of the mind
are objectified and alienated, and the "passive" element of the mind, the
bare subject, contracts. 2
As has been noted, this objectification of the subjective contents of
experience can be linked to grandiose delusions: for example, the belief
that the entire world is related uniquely to oneself or that its continued
existence or the unfolding of events depends on one's mental processes.
The claim to a completely private unified objective world contradicts
itself because, in essence, "objective" means public. The solipsistic
stance of "the world is necessarily my world because only I experience my
experience" is not only tautologous but incoherent, because there is more
than one center of consciousness in the world. Sass (1994) comments that
our claim to be self-contained in one's psychology is an impossible claim
in that survival requires relationship to others.
It is this self-containment that clashes with the subjectivities of
other people in contact with the psychotic individual. From the
existential stance of the psychotic, it is impossible to take into account
the differing subjective viewpoints of other people. The loss of
"objectivity" entails a loss of the appreciation of "intersubjectivity."
This manifests in profound difficulties for the psychotic in dealing with
other people: there may be no perception of other people's having
viewpoints at all, subsumed as they are into the psychotic's private
subjective world; alternatively, they may be perceived as sharing the
viewpoint of the psychotic (epistemologically, if not spatially), and
expressions of a differing viewpoint may be interpreted as deception or
subterfuge, overlaying the individual's real intentions. However, the
psychotic's delusory framework solves the paradox of the existence of
other centers of consciousness, the tension created between the
psychotic's epistemology and other people's is surely central to the
pathological nature of the state.
One prominent aspect of the delusional mood that has not been accounted
for by these analyses so far is the intense significance or meaning of
events or features of the world for the person. Not only are events
perceived as closely related or referring to the individual, but they may
be experienced as having some symbolic or metaphorical meaning that
is perceived quite immediately and incorrigibly.
It is possible that symbolic meaning is a structure or category
of cognition, and that it may develop as a framework to organize
representational stimuli, such as language, art, or symbols. Things refer
beyond themselves only to a subject who interprets them as such, but once
the framework that holds the interpreter and the interpreted apart has
eroded, the symbolic meaning of events or features may appear
self-subsistent. The role of the self in constituting the connection
between the sign and its meaning will not be taken into account
automatically, because of the reorganization of the place of the self in
relation to experience, and thus the psychotic may conclude [End Page
328] that the meaning was inherent in the object, or that the meaning
was indicated or revealed to them by some cosmic order or other agent.
Alternatively, or additionally, perceiving meaning could be seen as the
most fundamental activity of mind, without which there is no coherence and
unity to perception. Specifically metaphorical meaning could be
understood as reflecting the basic assimilation of independent events,
objects, or relations into preexisting conceptual categories or schema by
analogy. The conceptual context provides meaning in terms of more basic
patterns of relations than in nonpsychotic cognition, in which the
urdoxa provides the unexamined assumptions that frame the more
context-specific, self-independent, relative significance. Thus, in the
delusional mood, the previous frameworks of meaning have been eroded as
the dimensional structure of experience dissolves, and thus the "meaning
feeling" (Chadwick, 1992) is the necessary emergence of new patterns of
meaning.
This may also manifest in the feeling that meaning is elusive or
hidden: that there is some absolute meaning behind events that should be
discovered if possible. This urge could lead the individual into a
pathological process of searching for meaning at the inappropriate level
of analysis: in other words, trivial or practically insignificant events
in the world may be interpreted in terms of their relevance for
fundamental or cosmic processes, because they are not perceived within the
relative context of mundane human action. It is likely that as new
frameworks of meaning are constructed to maintain coherence, they will
reflect the most basic psychological and emotional organization of the
individualthe themes of the subconscious, in psychoanalytic terms. Thus
all events in the world will appear intimately bound up with the
preoccupations and themes of the self.
A Conceptual Analysis of Mystical Experience
Spiritual Systems:
Models of Experience and Reality
He who by discernment has effaced all
objectivity is one established in the Reality of Awareness. He is the
Fire of Awareness and the wielder of the vajra. He is the Hero who has
done away with death, cancelling time itself. (Ramana Maharshi,
Supplement to Reality in Forty verses, verse 23)
Various Eastern philosophies, such as Zen and Tibetan Buddhism, and
Tantric Yoga, include detailed conceptualizations of the kinds of altered
states usually labeled mystical. These explain the relation between
the mind and the world, and the fundamental nature of the world and the
self. In these cultures, the spiritual dimension is inextricably linked to
the material one, and mysticism is an accepted form of human experience.
Thus the psychic anatomy is as precisely described as the physical.
In this way, they offer models or systems through which the relationship
between spiritual states of consciousness and psychotic states can be
elucidated. It is important to note that the conceptualizations provided
offer a very different normative ideal of sanity, but accounts are also
given of mental disorders, with explicit connections given between
spiritual practice and disorder. The symptoms and signs given as markers
for pathological states are easily recognizable, indicating that some
similar states are recognized as illness in both Western psychiatric and
Eastern mystical cultures.
Buddhist Epistemology
A brief outline of the epistemological positions of Zen and Tibetan
Buddhism will demonstrate the alternative perspective on psychosis which
is provided by these philosophies. 3 Although there are various divergences between the
forms of Buddhism, particularly with regard to practice, there is an
extensive core of common ground, which is also shared to a certain extent
with Tantric Yoga, which I shall discuss below.
Buddhist epistemology is based fundamentally on the category of
relatio, in contrast to the ontology of the Platonic-Aristotelian
system, which can be described as being based on the category of
substantia. The relationship between the mind and the world is of
prime importance; from this viewpoint it is inappropriate to make an a
priori division between the two on the basis of some sharply
distinguishable essence that the mind or objects in the external
world could be [End Page 329] considered to have. In other words,
the mind and the world are viewed as intimately interrelated in Buddhist
thought, and thus a conceptual analysis of the structure of mind cannot be
carried out independently of a conceptual analysis of the structure of the
world at large.
One crucial feature of Buddhist epistemology is that the true nature of
ultimate reality diverges from its appearance to mundane perception. The
material world is viewed as illusory, in the sense that distinct
self-subsistent objects do not exist, but are fundamentally impermanent
and interdependent. Objects in the external world have no intrinsic
properties whatsoever, because all properties are relational and therefore
have no intrinsic and real identity. All that truly exists is a unity
(Brahman, the ground of all existence), which is a kind of
nonarticulated field or pregnant voidit is empty of "things" because
nothing has independent existence, but it manifests in the plurality of
the phenomenal world. This applies equally to minds as to objects in the
external world, because the distinction between subject and object is held
to be as illusory as the distinction between one object and another.
Because everything is looked at from a relational point of view, subject
and object are relative to each otherthere is no Ding an sich.
Life is a continuous being without a
beginning or an end . . . It is an artificial attitude that makes
sections in the stream of change and calls them things. Identity of
objects is an unreality. (Radhakrishnan, 1951)
It follows from this that the Buddhist notion of the self is in stark
contrast to the Western concept. Both the Platonic-Augustinian tradition
and the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition affirm the existence of an
individual soul. The Buddha proclaimed that the notion of self is false
and that there is no individual or abiding self apart from a cluster of
factors.
The concept of a soul as the substrate of the
changing states of consciousness, or of a thing as the bearer of
attributes is a myth. There is no unity holding together the states of
the attributes. (Mahadevan, 1974)
It is claimed that the only continuous thread is bhava, or
continuity of consciousness over time. There are only mental states:
thoughts, emotions, memories, sensations, and perceptions. There is no
I behind them, and yet without them there is no sense of I.
The I is the result of the basic unifying tendency of life
(principium individuationis): every living being tends to organize
a unity, and in the case of humans this confers self-consciousness. This
principle constructs a separate, enduring ego that is in contrast to the
rest of the world, but the separate self is an illusion.
What is the relationship of the ego as subject to the mental states it
is subject to? Mental states are regarded as objects by the self, which
looks at them from the outside. But this division is an illusion, because
all mental states are subjective, and not objects of a subject; the self
is nothing but a series of mental states, and as such is indefinite.
The Nature and Structure of Mind in Mundane and Mystical
States
In Buddhist doctrine, consciousness is conceptualized as an
interactiona relationship between the subject and an object. As a dynamic
system of factors and processes, the mind can function in various modes or
states of organization and can be developed toward the cognitive and
affective state described as enlightenment through a system of
techniques such as meditation. The worldly or mundane consciousness is
seen as ignorant, because it produces an illusory view of reality, and it
undergoes radical restructuring during spiritual practice. Ignorance can
be eliminated by fostering "mindfulness, law, energy, bliss, tranquility,
concentration, and equanimity" (Ramaswami and Shiekh 1989, 102). These
foster panna, which is understanding or insight, an
intellectual tool. Importantly, it is not knowledge. It is
described as referring to a conscious clarification of facts, laws, and
doctrines; to understand it is to see relations and
connections. It is interesting to note that extrasensory perception
is viewed as a valid means of knowing: for example, two dassanas
(ways of perceiving) are defined as knowledge and insight of salvation and
knowledge of things as they are.
The difference in organization between the mundane and transcendent
states is best described in this context in philosophical language,
because the proliferation of terms used in the Buddhist [End Page
330] doctrines frequently causes problems of translation. The analysis
below is based on Zen doctrine (Izutsu, 1982), to which the exhaustive
taxonomy of mental factors and processes is not central. The rise of
prajna (the transcendental cognition) consists in a complete
transformation occurring in the ego structure of the subject, which is the
counterpart to the transformation of the perceived world. Thus subjective
stages of cognition imply the presence of a corresponding ontological
dimension.
The mundane consciousness produces the empirical worldview (in Western
rationalist terms, the sane view). It is characterized by a sharp
opposition between the subject and its objects, a dichotomy of reality.
Thus, the empirical ego posits itself as an irreducible ego substance, and
simultaneously posits irreducible object substances out there in the
external world. The empirical ego can be viewed as the subject, the center
of perception, thinking and actions. However, behind the subjective
experience of the world is hidden a more basic factor upon which it
depends: the awareness of the experience that illuminates the
world-directed awareness. In other words, behind the I see in I
see this there must be I SEE myself, where the capitals signal
a more fundamental process of awareness.
Viewed from the standpoint of prajna, the object is perceived by
virtue not of self-subsistence, but of the activity of the same process
that underpins the empirical ego. In other words, within the object (which
to the mundane view seems self-subsistent) is I SEE the object.
This may appear paradoxical, but it is a means of describing how both
sides of the relative pair of object and subject are manifestations of the
same process or energy of awareness.
Thus, in transcendental cognition, there is a unification of subject
and object in the process of awareness. The phenomenal world as it appears
to transcendental cognition is charged with a peculiar kind of dynamic
power, which may be indicated by the verb SEE. This kind of
cognition can be illustrated by the example of an artist or musician who
is so absorbed in the creative process that any distinction between the
subject and the object dissolves into the pure act.
This somewhat obscure SEE is the ultimate
RealityBrahman. It is claimed that it can make itself felt in the
mind of a person living in the empirical "dimension" of existence. The
first symptom is a feeling of unease about the nature of reality as it is
seen, a vague feeling that the true reality of the self and external
things is of a different nature. In religious doctrine this is seen as the
start of the aspiration toward enlightenment. In psychiatric doctrine,
this may be seen as derealization or some similar pathological symptom.
From here, subjective experience loses its solidity, and the empirical
form is perceived as a pseudoreality. The individual will turn away from
pseudoreality and be drawn toward whatever might be the "real" reality.
However, it is maintained that the truth is not attainable through a
purely mental process, in the sense of representation, imagination, or
thinking, because it is not a matter of cognition in the narrow sense
understood from the mundane perspective. This may seem to contradict the
description of enlightenment as a cognitive state, but the crucial point
is that in some forms of mental organization, certain mental processes
cease. For example, during meditation, different concentrations are
achieved, in which various forms of cognition, such as discursive
thinking, cease. If one merely proceeds along the stages of
self-cognition, the self will continue to recede, because it will remain
an "object" known or to be known.
The discriminating intellect perceives things in terms of their
identity. In the epistemological dimension accessed by transcendental
cognition, the identity of objects is seen to go absolutely beyond
the determinations and delimitations of the identity seen from the
perspective of the discriminating activity of the relative intellect. Thus
both "A is A" and "A is not-A" can be maintained simultaneously.
In the nullification of individual things in the void, or
Nothingness, the ego (which has hitherto been distinguishing itself
from others) becomes nullified, and its representation as a
self-subsistent entity dissolves. This is not unconsciousness; it is the
loss of awareness of the empirical ego, but awareness itself remains. In
this state, it said that things lose their essential delimitations,
reflect each other, and are reflected by each other endlessly. [End
Page 331] This awareness (earlier denoted by SEE) is described
as light or illumination, and is also referred to as
Mind. But it is crucial to appreciate that this does not mean the
kind of mind that individual persons have. It is reality before it is
broken up into the basic dichotomy of subject and object, mind and thing.
The mind as understood in the ordinary sense is an abstraction; the
subjective aspect of the Mind-Reality grasped as an independent factor and
posited as an individual, self-subsistent psychological principle. Thus,
"all things are but one mind" does not mean that the mind as ordinarily
understood produces or creates all things out of itself. Rather, out of
the Mind-Reality emerges subject and object. The mind as understood
in the ordinary sense is in this view only an element indistinguishably
fused with its "objective" counterpart into the unity of the Mind-Reality
as a totality.
Tantric Systems
Both Tibetan Buddhism and Tantric Hinduism involve the concepts of
energetic processes that underlie the functioning of both the physical and
mental aspects of the person. A vital force or energy (prana; ch'i)
is said to move in channels throughout the body, and it is affected by
multiple factors, both environmental and psychological. This energy
consists of three different elements, corresponding to different physical
and cognitive functions. Alterations in the flow disturb or alter the
mental or physical processes that depend upon it. It is thought to be
channeled, controlled, and developed in the practice of meditation, and
disrupted or blocked in disease.
Tantric Yoga diverges from Buddhism in that it involves the concept of
the goddess, who is understood as manifesting on all levels of the
universe from the physical to pure consciousness, and therefore is related
to many levels of conceptualization, including the philosophical or
abstract (Frawley, 1994). In this sense, the system allows a synthesis of
philosophical or conceptual analyses of mental states with the functional
model of the mind such as is represented by the concepts of the different
energies, and their psychological aspects.
The process of yogic transformation (akin to the rise of
prajna or enlightenment) is described conceptually,
psychologically, and functionally in terms of (1) the action of the
spiritual energies, which correspond to psychological factors; (2) the
forms of the goddess, which represent the ultimate aspects of reality, and
what is passed through and understood during the process. As the various
spiritual energies are developed, the corresponding cognitive functions
develop, resulting in the emergence of an altered cognitive organization
that allows for an altered experience of realitythe ultimate reality,
according to the epistemology. The forms, although they may have the
appearance of deities, can, in their abstract conceptualizations, be
linked to Kant's categories of understanding, and the way that the
structure of experience alters in psychotic experiences as well as
spiritual ones.
Tantra, like Buddhist thought, characterizes the world as the
manifestation of consciousness, and therefore the dualistic conception of
the reality of the world in contrast to the unreality of mental concepts
is viewed as delusory. There is little real distinction between the
Buddhist doctrine that the material world is illusory and the tantric
philosophy that grants a reality to the external world, because in both
cases the external world is viewed as a kind of mental dimension, and the
basic reality transcends such distinctions: consciousness is the sole
reality in the universe.
The Spiritual Energies
The life-sustaining flow is divided into the energies of Prana
(air), Ojas (water), and Tejas (fire), each of which
corresponds to a different aspect of mental functioning. Tejas
corresponds to reason, which carries out discriminative perception
and functions in a quantitative manner to create a materialistic idea of
reality. Active processes involving will or volition depend
on Tejas. Prana corresponds to feeling, which can be
understood as the passive, receptive aspects of the mind: it is not
reactive, but allows for conscious awareness, knowing, relating to or
uniting with objects of experience. The ability to move thoughts and
perceptions depends on Prana. Ojas supports Tejas and
Prana, and corresponds to an [End Page 332] underlying
capacity for patience and mental endurance. The energies must be kept in
dynamic balance for healthy mental functioning.
Two further components of mental functioning are Soul and Ego.
Soul is the aspiration toward truth, and Ego is the power of
identification, the division between subject and object. Finally, the
Sensate Mind coordinates sensory and motor functions, and is
dominated by reactive emotions.
During the process of yogic transformation, the energies are developed
through diet and meditation practices. As the energies are developed, the
cognitive functions develop, and if one factor increases out of proportion
the balance will be disturbed and disorder can result. It is important to
develop sufficient Ojas to sustain the development of Tejas
and Prana. It is particularly affected by environmental factors
such as poor diet, fatigue, emotional strain, changing circumstances, and
so on, all of which burn up Ojas. Moreover, equanimity must be
maintained throughout the transformation process, negative emotions must
be eliminated, and negative energies avoided.
It is emphasized that if Tejas or Prana are developed
without the appropriate grounding in purification and equanimity, an
exaggeration of normal human drives such as excessive anger or sexuality
can occur, or the individual may develop messianic ideation. Proper
understanding and training in a yogic system should precede or accompany
any attempts to produce altered or expanded states of consciousness,
because dangers occur when one tries to use the mind or ego to achieve
results (Frawley, 1994).
The Forms of The Goddess
The 10 forms can be divided into two groups: one group represents the
prime principles of existence, consisting of Time, Space, The Word, Light,
and Energy; the other represents the methods of transformation, consisting
of Perception, Knowledge, Voidness, Stillness, and Delight. (All the forms
are closely interrelated.) Moreover, they can be divided into the Terrible
and the Benefic, indicating explicitly that this system acknowledges the
potential dangers and unpleasant aspects of spiritual experiences. Each
form represents both the relative aspect of the dimension or process, such
as is perceived in the ordinary state of mind, and the absolute aspect,
such as is perceived in the transcendent state of mind. The meditation
practices associated with the perception or encounter of each form
illustrate the organisation of experience, and can be compared with the
analyses of mind in the preceding sections. A brief summary of the
significance of the forms is given in the endnotes. 4
The relevance of the tantric system can be illustrated with a few
examples of the points of comparison between the descriptions of the
delusional mood given above, and the meaning of the goddess forms. For
example, an aspect of Kali is the apprehension of absolute Time, in
the sense of perpetual changeless duration, which resonates with the
alterations of time perception, notably the sense of timelessness or
extended present described by some individuals in psychosis. Moreover, an
encounter with Kali is said to involve a deeply unsettling or
terrifying negation of form, knowledge, and desires: this reflects the
sense of the unreality or hollowness of the physical world and the loss of
previous interpretational schema seen in the delusional mood, as well as
the physical disturbances of appetite, libido, and sleep that frequently
accompany it.
Tripura Sundari represents a kind of cognition in which
universal themes or significance are revealed in relative perceptions,
through the loss of constraint by concepts of time, space, and relative
significance. This can be interpreted as the same phenomenon as the
perception of metaphorical meaning in events (delusional perception), and
this kind of cognition is facilitated by a meditation approach which also
culminates in a loss of subject/object boundaries.
Chhinnamasta represents the realization of the illusion of
embodied existence and the thought-composed mind: in other words, the
painful process of ego sacrifice. The meditation approach is to turn the
attention to the process of perception itself, and there are obvious
comparisons to be drawn with the subjectivization of the physical world
and ego disturbances that are core features of the delusional mood.
[End Page 333]
Comparisons, Similarities, and Implications
From the Eastern spiritual systems examined, a basic structure of
mystical experience can be extracted. The attention is turned inward, away
from involvement in practical or worldly matters, so that the process of
perception itself is the focus of attention. The thoughts and perceptions
that arise are passively experienced, leading to nonidentification with
these mental events. The discriminating aspect of the mind perceives that
the self as subject is not identical with any mental event, but is an
abstraction from pure awareness, which illuminates every mental event.
Consequential to this are the realizations that the true nature of reality
transcends the subject/object dichotomy, that the self is not a discrete
entity and has no definitive boundaries against the world, and that the
division of the world into entities is a function of the mind. This
existential stance constitutes a radical alteration of the structure of
experience, so that the old ontology of the material world in contrast to
an independently existing self is unsustainable.
The similarities between this state and the psychotic state or
delusional mood are immediately apparent: the shift of attention away from
practical and social worlds and away from sensorimotor activity, the loss
of distinction between the subjective and objective worlds, the concurrent
erosion of the experience of self, and the loss or serious weakening of
the prior ontology that depends on the cognitive structural framework of
time, space, substance, identity, and so on.
Moreover, the epistemologies of the systems examined validate the
experience of psychosis, in a sense, in that the material world, and the
embodied, thought-composed, independently existent, and discrete self are
held to be delusions of the ordinary mind, obscuring a more unified
fundamental reality that transcends the relative phenomenal world
perceived via the categories of understanding. Accounts of the delusional
mood that describe the world as illusory, so much empty scenery, or
pervaded by knowing chimes with this view of the phenomenal world as a
manifestation of pure awareness. Psychotic notions of mental efficacy are
also mirrored in these religious systems in that the causal power of
thought is seen in visualization practices found in Hindu Yoga and Tibetan
Buddhism.
Finally, in the Tantric Yogic system we see reference to both the bliss
of the transcendent vision and the terror and anxiety that can be caused
by the shift in cognitive organization. Psychotic episodes sometimes begin
with a period of ecstatic revelation before the fear and confusion more
usually associated with psychosis start to emerge. Moreover, a sense of
rebirth or awakening may accompany the initial stage, which might be
interpreted as delusory, but is taken quite literally in the spiritual
systems.
However, despite the different normative ideal of sanity, the
tantric systems acknowledge the dangers of spiritual experiences, and give
accounts of mental disorder in terms of imbalances of spiritual energies,
which relate to altered experiential structure as well as emotional and
physical symptoms. 5 This attitude is not peculiar to tantra; in North
American Indian thought, mystical experiences come in two kinds: the
beautiful and the dangerous. In diverse religious traditions, one finds
the notion that mystical experiences should only be approached with
caution, with thorough grounding in basic spiritual practices, and
wherever possible with guidance from appropriate teachers or religious
groups.
Jewish (Kabbalistic) mysticism is no exception: risks are considered to
be posed by entry into ecstatic states, loss of boundaries, and
revelations that are unverifiable. In particular, it is suggested that
novice mystics may suffer dangerously extreme emotional responses of
elation or despair from their mystical experiences of expansion or
contraction of self. Quashayri (an 11th century mystic) stated that
expansion is the greatest danger, leading to grandiosity and solipsistic
delusions. Thus distinctions are drawn between beneficial and pathological
altered states of consciousness, even where there is an extensive common
element between them.
Differences
Although exhibiting a very similar conceptual structure, a psychotic
state differs from a mystical [End Page 334] state in the following
ways: (1) a maintenance of the ego structure, albeit in a distorted or
fragmented fashion, and a concurrent maintenance of some subject/object
distinctions; (2) less ability to control attention; and (3) less ability
to maintain equanimity, demonstrated by emotionality, confusion, and
anxiety. These factors impact the subjective experience of the individual
in ways that can be understood to lead to the formation of the kinds of
delusions to which a psychotic label is attached.
All the systems examined emphasize the need for groundwork to be laid
before the ontological shift takes place: as the old ego structure
(represented by the assumption of a discrete self to whom certain
experiences belong) is threatened by the new ontology, negative emotional
reactions to the experience may occur. Only if the ego structure can be
relinquished (in the sense of a suspension of attachment to or
identification with certain aspects of experience), and equanimity
maintained throughout the process, will the transformation occur without
problems. The dangers occur if the ego structures are not abandoned, so
that residual subject/object distinctions and self-identifications are
experienced. If this happens in the altered state, when attention is
turned inward on the subjective experience, the experience will become
distorted: a self will be identified either in the totality of
perceptions, leading to the expansive experience that the world is
constituted entirely by oneself alone, or else the self will be identified
with the bare subject, leading to the contractive experience of negation
and loss of will.
In other words, if when the ego structure is threatened by the
undifferentiated experience of awareness, the intellect attempts to
reestablish objects and thus reify the self, a unification of perceptions
by reference to a self may occur, leading to the perception either that
the world consists of the self, or that the self constitutes the world.
Alternatively, in attempting to find the self as subject in awareness, and
failing (because there is no differentiation within this experience), the
intellect may dichotomize the experience into a negated or empty self and
an active world. If the individual attempts to interpret the experience in
terms of mundane schema (the epistemological organization of which will be
incompatible with the undifferentiated experience), it is possible to see
how delusions of grandeur and omnipotence on the one hand, or delusions of
passivity, control, or observation on the other, could emerge.
Conclusion
Before enlightenment: chop wood, carry
water; after enlightenment: chop wood, carry water. (Zen proverb)
This examination of mystical and psychotic states of consciousness has
brought out some general points regarding the nature of the mind and the
locus of pathology in psychosis, as well as the distinctions that can be
made between the states. First, the mind seems best viewed as a dynamic
system of processes capable of operating via different existential
organizations. This can be seen in the developmental changes that occur in
childhood, as well as in the changes that can be effected through
meditational practice. It follows that psychosis need not necessarily be
viewed as the result of a physical disease process, because alterations of
the dynamic system can be achieved through intentional causation as well
as nonintentional causation. 6
The relationship between spiritual and psychotic states seems to be
very close, because they exhibit similar organizational features and may
be caused by the same kinds of processes. Both spiritual and psychotic
experiences can occur spontaneously, and practices intended to bring about
spiritual experiences may cause psychotic states if the practice is not
well supported. Moreover, altered forms of experience that occur
spontaneously may be identical to spiritual states, but may transmute into
psychotic states depending on the response by the individual.
The pathology that differentiates the psychotic from the benign
mystical state lies not in the content of beliefs, or even in the broad
form of experience, but in a few interrelated commonsense factors. It
consists of an inability to return to the ontological framework of
consensus reality; in psychological isolation, and inability to
accommodate to the subjectivity of others; in a [End Page 335]
focus of interest in the mental realm and loss of practical concerns that
leads to paucity of action and neglect of self-care.
These factors can be seen to be related to differences in the
organization of experience that in turn can be related to various causal
factors. As discussed, maintenance of the ego structures or processes of
self-identification during the alteration of experience caused by turning
the attention inward leads to a state in which the individual is seeking
meaning in the very connections that her or his own mind is generating, or
in other words, approaching her or his own subjectivity from a distance,
as if it were an object. This isolates the individual in a kind of
goldfish bowl of her or his own subjectivity, unable to act and cognize in
direct interaction with the external world, because all events are
perceived via the reified filter of her or his necessarily
self-referential preoccupations.
Moreover, if the ego structures are maintained, attempts will be made
to reify the individual's sense of existence and identity by creating
models that conceptualize the position of the self with regards to the
(fluid and self-reflective) world. Because the epistemological dimension
apparent to the individual in the altered state will not be amenable to
capture in ordinary conceptual terms, because it essentially transcends
the divisions and contrasts made by the discriminating intellect, this
project is doomed to failure. However, because the fundamental identity of
the individual is threatened, finding an epistemological framework that
lends ontological security becomes of absolute prime importance to the
subjective survival of the individual.
As these cognitive structures are laid down, each layer forming the
basic assumptions upon which further cognitions depend, they relax the
ontological insecurity and are too valuable to the ego in terms of shoring
up personal identity to be abandoned. However, reflecting as they will the
distorted epistemology of the mystical vision objectified, they will be
incompatible with consensus reality, which depends on a different
epistemological framework.
The ego structures are likely to be maintained if the alteration in
consciousness is not prepared for or expected. Thus, if a
neuropharmacologic or neurofunctional alteration is caused by physical or
environmental factors or psychoactive drug use, an initial mystical state
may be very likely to precipitate a pathological psychotic reaction.
Interpretation in terms of religious themes and concepts, as is seen
frequently in psychosis, can be understood as representing the best fit
with the mystical experiences undergone, although they can be pathological
or not, depending on to what extent the defense of the ego depends on
them. Therefore, experiences interpreted as religious can be psychotic,
even though they have a genuine affiliation to religious experiences.
Benign mystical experiences therefore can be seen to involve an
identical disintegration of the mundane worldview, but the experience can
be passed through and reintegrated because an appropriate perspective is
taken toward the process. This seems to consist most centrally in the
suspension of identificatory processes, which facilitates a truly
nondualistic attitude toward experience; this in turn allows for a
fundamental transformation in existential perspective, without expansion
or contraction of the sense of self, or a loss of central coherence. Thus,
in psychosis there may be an objectivization of thoughts that leads to an
ascription of externality or alien provenance; in mysticism a lack of
identification with thoughts leads to freedom from blind reaction to their
content.
In the wake of mystical experience, there is no persistent or damaging
loss of interest in the physical or mundane world, because it is
appreciated that the transcendent vision lies at the basis of mundane
cognition, and is not separate from it; the world as it appears to the
transcendent vision is identical to and manifests in the mundane world.
Most important is the ability to maintain equanimity during the
disintegration of the familiar ontology, to remain unattached to any
particular idea or belief that may emerge as a conceptualization of the
experience, and to avoid externalizing the process by perceiving the
changes as originating in the world (of consensus reality) rather than in
the self. 7 Because the experience represents perception without
the filter of cognitive frameworks, it should be left implicit [End
Page 336] as the basis for ordinary cognition, not made explicit (and
distorted) as factual statements. This is reflected in the Zen
paradox, which seeks to communicate the way rational thought cannot
capture total reality (Watts, 1957).
In contrast, the psychotic invests the conceptualization of the
experience with great emotional significance, because it serves the
purpose of contextualizing and reifying the sense of identity, which is
under threat. This acts as a pressure to maintain the new schemata, even
when they conflict with events and the schemata of other people. What is
sometimes described as poor reality testing might be better
described as the failure to accommodate to the frustration of desires or
expectations. The delusional pattern of cognition is to accommodate in a
way that elaborates on the existing structure, rather than supplanting it
(Leeser and O'Donohue, 1999). Thus a pathological feature could be
identified as the inability to drop the new model and to tolerate the
consequent loss of structural stability and personal security.
Finally, it is fruitful to step back from the close-up view of the form
of altered experience and look at the psychotic or mystic in the larger
context of society. As has been noted, the crucial feature of the
psychotic is the tension between his subjectivity and that of other
people, and the paradox that other people pose for the psychotic
epistemology. Because the person in psychosis is perceiving events colored
heavily by his new interpretative framework, which effectively
externalizes his personal emotive themes, it is extremely difficult for
him to take into account other people's perspectives.
This amounts to a dropping out of the matrix of shared frames of
reference that constitutes the public domain of intersubjectivity. This is
probably the prime factor that leads to the labeling of a person as
psychotic, although it can be seen that the mystical vision may also be
incompatible with intersubjective reality, because it involves a different
ontological framework. Successful communication involves adopting a shared
frame of reference with the other person, and the psychotic tendency to
assimilate and not accommodate to conflicting frameworks means that she or
he falls prey to a vicious circle of social isolation and
incomprehensibility. Conflicting paradigms presented by other people's
subjectivities, and particularly doubt and skepticism, could be expected
to threaten the already undermined subjectivity of the psychotic person,
leading him or her to reify and elaborate his or her framework in defense.
The fundamental loss of trust in others, and of others in the psychotic
individual, may frequently fuel paranoid ideation.
To conclude, therefore, it appears that a detailed appreciation of the
deep connections between mystical and psychotic experiences may be of
relevance to the understanding of the psychotic condition. This can only
facilitate greater empathy with those in apparently incomprehensible
psychotic states, as well as encouraging therapeutic strategies based on
examining the individual's emotional response to and metacognitions about
psychotic phenomena. It also supports a reconsideration of the implicitly
assumed working definition of psychosis.
Caroline Brett is currently pursuing a doctorate in
Psychology examining processes involved in clinical and nonclinical
incidence of anomalous experience. She read Philosophy & Psychology at
Christ Church, Oxford, graduating in 1998. In 2000 she studied for the
Master's of Science in Philosophy of Mental Disorder at King's College
London and the Institute of Psychiatry. She can be contacted at Caroline
Box P 067, Psychological Medicine, Institute of Psychiatry, De Crespigny
Park, Denmark Hill, London SE5 8AF. E-mail: c.brett@iop.kcl.ac.uk.
Notes
1. The differentiation of prepsychotic from
psychotic symptoms is not firmly established, but the delusional
mood has been chosen as a common early state, involving a cluster of
related perceptual and cognitive changes, which frequently seems to
precede (and possibly underlie) the emergence of frank delusions or
hallucinations.
2. This is a speculative model, and the concepts employed
may benefit from some elucidation. The model assumes that ordinary
self-aware cognition involves a constant integration of active generative
processes and passive receptive processes that are effectively two sides
of the same coin of agential consciousness. The model is based on the
observation that subjective mental events include both goal-directed
cognitions generated according to the agenda of the agent, and an
awareness of stimuli from both external and internal sources. The self is
both agent and subject of its own mental processes. Therefore, if the
focus of attention is applied to subjective mental contents, and these are
apprehended by means of conceptual structures or categories, specifically
the subject/object distinction that creates the self-existent external
world and internal self, the self-generated contents of cognition could be
objectified and experienced as alien. The passive processes of the aware
subject, which ordinarily intend the full scope of externally and
internally derived stimuli, [End Page 337] which are represented as
objective, and subjective, respectively, now intend this representation.
The self as subject remains, but in a contracted role.
(There is no assumption of isomorphism between this conceptual model
and the neurologic mechanisms that might implement it: that is, it is not
assumed that there are two separate mechanisms, one of which generates
cognition and one of which is aware of or represents cognition, because
this would be to import illegitimate intentional concepts into
neuropsychology.)
3. For a more detailed exposition of the epistemology and
philosophy of Buddhism, see Watts (1957), Wallace (1996), and Izutsu
(1982).
4. The 10 Forms of the Goddess are as follows. Kali
represents Time, in the relative sense of transience and mortality, and
the absolute sense of perpetual changeless duration. The state of mind
conceptualised as an encounter with Kali is said to be frightening
to the ordinary vision, and involves the power of the negation of form,
knowledge, and desires.
Bhuvaneshvari represents Space, both physical and mental, in the
relative sense of place, direction, and measurement, and in the absolute
sense of the matrix in which things grow. The meditation approach is to
cultivate an attitude of uninvolvement with the objects of perception, so
that one becomes a passive witness.
Tara represents The Word, in the relative sense of the
differentiation of meanings through sound, and the absolute sense of the
creative vibration that is the basis of all relative meaning.
Tripura Sundari represents the Light of perception that is
manifest in relative perceptions: freed of the concepts of time, space,
and relative significance, it is said that each perception reveals the
eternal presence and becomes a universe in itself. The meditation approach
is to cultivate the experience that there is no differentiation to be made
between the perceiver and the perceived, and in this state of unity, the
mind is stopped and enters a blissful state.
Bhairavi represents Energy, in the relative sense of speech, and
the absolute sense of unarticulated will power. She is connected with the
arousal of Tejas, which burns away the illusions and limitations of
egocentric existence, and her power is said to be terrifying. As such, she
is an awesome force that should not be aroused unless the individual is
ready.
Chhinnamasta represents Perception beyond the ordinary mind: the
realisation of the illusion of embodied existence and the thought-composed
mind. The meditation approach is to attend to the perceptual process, and
thereby to withdraw self- identification with thoughts and objects, with
the result that the world is perceived as a shifting pattern of
perceptions that thought divides into objects, but that do not have
substantiality. The process is described as extremely frightening and even
physically painful, and is said to remove the person permanently from the
realm of ordinary existence. The initial stages of the process are liable
to cause doubt and anxiety, as one loses one's ordinary sense of identity.
The pain of the ego sacrifice is said to cause a radical reorganisation of
the energies (and thus mind), which is experienced as rebirth.
Matangi represents Knowledge in the sense of articulated
thought, particularly maverick or mystical thought, inspiration.
Dhumavati represents Voidness, in the absolute sense of
unmanifest potential energy before the impulse of Will; self-illumining
reality free of the duality of subject and object. In the relative sense,
she represents the wisdom of ignoring or forgetting opinions and beliefs.
The meditation approach is to become detached from apparent realities, to
withdraw from the familiar or known: this is achieved by discarding
thoughts and focus on objects, and attending to the background presence in
which they occur.
5. Mental Disorder according to Tantric systems is as
follows. The Eastern spiritual systems outlined describe various mental
disorders that are associated with spiritual practice. These disorders as
described appear similar to psychotic symptoms and disorders as identified
by Western psychiatry, although they are never identified by the content
of beliefs, only by physical symptoms, manner, and appearance of the
individual. The framework of the tantric systems allows both
nonintentional causes (e.g., diet, physical fatigue or stress, and
insomnia) and intentional causes (e.g., dynamic imbalance caused by the
practice of meditation, emotional or mental stress, and life changes) to
play a role in the development of these disorders through the impact of
either kind of factor on the energetic processes. The factors that impact
on the energetic processes correspond very closely to the factors
identified by Western psychiatric practice as precipitating psychotic
breaks.
Tibetan Buddhism describes a specific kind of disorder that is
associated with improper meditation practice. It is most likely to arise
in meditators who are improperly instructed in methods designed to
concentrate the mind, who develop an altered state (concentration)
without first dealing with negative emotions and fears, who do not balance
discrimination-perception with feeling-awareness so that concentration
involves effort, or who worry about spiritual progress when the mind is
already concentrated to such a degree that external sensory inputs no
longer occur. The main features of this disorder are racing thoughts,
anxiety, restlessness, an inability to concentrate effectively on
another's words, and reluctance to answer questions. The mind and speech
jump from subject to subject, [End Page 338] often before one
thought is completely finished. This is an example of intentional factors
causing disturbed mental functioning that appears to resemble a kind of
manic psychosis.
According to the Tantric Yogic system, imbalances of the three elements
of Prana, Tejas, and Ojas can manifest in mental
disorders. Because the elements are affected by both physical and mental
factors, certain disorders can be caused by spiritual practices,
indicating again that psychotic states can be viewed as "intentionally"
caused dynamic imbalances. However, it is held that temporary imbalances
may occur as adjustment phases in the process of liberation from ordinary
consciousness. Unusual pranic movements, the experience of powerful
emotions, visions, hearing inner sounds, contacting gurus and deities
telepathically, and so on, are not necessarily recognised as signs of
disorders in this system, implying that genuine spiritual growth may lead
to mild psychotic symptoms.
Excess Prana is said to cause loss of mental control and loss of
sensory and motor coordination, with possible tremors or erratic
movements. One feels ungrounded, out, and as though one is losing one's
mind or sense of identity. Anxiety and palpitations may occur, along with
insomnia, a general experience of disequilibrium, or hyperventilation.
Excess Tejas is said to cause an overly critical and
discriminating mind, with pressure of speech, possible delirium, and
pressure or pain in the head. Clarity is excessive or destructive; anger,
irritability, and enmity are possible, as well as pathologic doubt. One
can become manipulative, dominating, fault finding with others, and may
have delusions of power and knowledge as well as paranoia.
When Ojas is deficient (it is burned up by high Tejas and
Prana), the mind and emotions are unstable, one is easily bothered
by lights and noises, and there is fear, anxiety, restlessness, and
insomnia. One lacks confidence, is unable to concentrate, and memory
becomes poor. There will be little consistency to thoughts or balance to
emotions. Nervous exhaustion or mental breakdowns become possible.
One way to conceptualise the relationship is to see Tejas as
power, Prana as velocity, and Ojas as capacity: if you
develop the either of the former without sufficient Ojas it is like
trying to put 1000 watts into a 100-watt bulbthe bulb will burst.
One category of serious disturbance is that of Kundalini
disorders, which involve wrong movement of Prana, causing disturbed
mental or neuromuscular functioning, or premature development of
Tejas. Depending on the laterality of the channel, the
Kundalini energy becomes redirected into, either grandiosity and a
domineering attitude are displayed, or unstable emotional states and
deranging psychic abilities. If the energy switches back and forth,
Vata (Wind) disorders are created, with insomnia, hallucinations,
fear, and anxiety.
Thus the tantric system accounts for psychotic disorders in terms of
the spiritual energies, which can also be related to the conceptual
account. A distinction is drawn between healthy or pure spiritual
experiences, and the genuine but one-sided or pathologic experiences that
may stem from flawed spiritual practice or other environmental and
psychological factors.
6. Whether this interpretation is suitable for all or only
a subsector of psychotic states is beyond the scope of this paper;
however, it is not incompatible with biopsychosocial models, which
emphasise the role of genetic and neurodevelopmental factors in the
aetiology of psychotic disorders.
7. The writings of Stanislav Grof express very similar
conclusions regarding the factors that distinguish the psychotic process
from the mystical one. In Beyond the Brain (1985, 303-7), Grof
writes:
Functional matrices that are instrumental in
psychotic episodes are intrinsic and integral parts of human
personality. The same perinatal and transpersonal matrices that are
involved in psychotic breakdowns can, under certain circumstances,
mediate the process of spiritual transformation and consciousness
evolution. The critical problem in understanding psychosis is, then, to
identify the factors that distinguish the psychotic process from the
mystical one . . . The individual's capacity to keep the process
internalized, 'own' it as an intrapsychic happening, and complete it
internally without acting on it prematurely is clearly associated with
the mystical attitude. . . Exteriorization of the process, excessive use
of the mechanism of projection, and indiscriminate acting out are
characteristic of the psychotic style in confronting one's psyche . . .
Psychotic states thus represent an interface confusion between the inner
world and consensus reality . . . An experience of unity with the divine
that is well completed and integrated involves a sense of deep peace,
tranquility, and serenity . . . Schizophrenic patients, on the other
hand, tend to interpret their experiential connection with the divine in
terms of their uniqueness and their special role in the universal scheme
of things. They evaluate the relevance of their new insights in terms of
their identification with their everyday personalities or body-egos,
which they have not surrendered.
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